TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/election/68elect/68elect.018

Text File | 1992-08-29 | 5.6 KB | 107 lines

                                                                                June 5, 1972

SALT I

Slowing Down the Arms Race



     Despite the justifiable fanfare in Moscow over the U.S.-
Soviet agreements on limiting strategic nuclear weapons, the
summit signing was, except for a few last-minute technical
hitches, mainly a formality. The details had been worked out in
tough, painstaking but nonpolemical SALT negotiations extending
over 2 1/2 years. Through some 130 separate meetings, alternating
between Helsinki and Vienna, the talks were often deadlocked and
agreement seemed improbable. But in the end, both sides showed a
realistic willingness to compromise. The result should be a
historic slowdown in the costly and dangerous arms race. It does
not end that race, however, and even more painful bargaining lies
ahead.

     In broad perspective, the agreements formalized the U.S.
shift from the Eisenhower-Kennedy insistence upon "nuclear
superiority" to what the Nixon Administration terms "nuclear
sufficiency." Since the Soviet Union was intent upon reaching at
least parity with the U.S. and since both sides possess a
tremendous overkill capability, the new U.S. stance makes sound
sense. In agreeing that defensive missiles will be limited to two
sites in each nation and that no more offensive ballistic
missiles will be installed, the U.S. risks little; the "balance
of terror" will not be upset to the advantage of either side.

     The initial impasse came when the Soviet negotiators wanted
to tackle limits on defensive systems first; the U.S. insisted
that offensive and defensive weapons should not be considered
separately. Later, the Russians demanded that some 600 U.S.
aircraft carrying tactical nuclear weapons from bases in Europe
or with the Sixth Fleet be classed as offensive systems, since
they could strike the U.S.S.R. But Moscow regarded its own
tactical nukes, capable of reaching NATO forces in Europe, as
defensive. The U.S. finally agreed to discuss ABMs first, and the
Russians agreed to exclude short-range nuclear weapons from the
freeze on offensive systems.

     Freeze. The ABM treaty allows each nation one defensive
installation at an ICBM site and one at its capital, with a
maximum of 100 missiles at each location. Thus the U.S. will be
able to complete its Safeguard ABM facility near Grand Forks, N.
Dak., but must discontinue the other one it is building near
Montana's Malmstrom Air Force Base. New appropriations would be
required for an ABM array around Washington. The Soviet Union
already has ABMs protecting Moscow; where it will place its
second site is not known.

     On the surface, the freeze on offensive weapons looks like a
Soviet gain. The executive agreement will permit the U.S.S.R. to
hold a lead (1,618 to 1,054) in land-based ICBMs. It will be
allowed to overtake the U.S., by an insignificant single vessel,
in nuclear-missile submarines (42 to 41), since Russia will be
permitted to complete 17 such subs.

     The agreement allows some shifting in the particular mix of
land- and sea-based ICBMs each nation wishes to deploy, so long
as the total number of missiles is not affected. But it says
nothing at all about how many warheads each missile can contain.
Therein lies a huge advantage for the U.S., at least for now.
Since the U.S. has missiles that carry up to ten independently
targeted warheads (MIRVs) and these systems are far ahead of the
Soviet multiple warheads, which fall in a cluster but cannot be
individually directed (MRVs), the U.S. maintains an overwhelming
edge of 5,700 to 2,500 in warheads.

     Warhead Gap. There is not, however, any limitation on
improving existing ICBMs under the executive agreement. Thus the
arms race is expected to turn to qualitative rather than
quantitative efforts. U.S. experts estimate that it will take the
Russians until the late 70s to develop and deploy MIRV missiles
and thus close the warhead gap -- if the U.S. stops further MIRV
deployment. The U.S., meanwhile, is free to go ahead with
advances like its ULMS longer-range submarine-launched missile
system, which involves at least ten advanced subs with 24
missiles each. Both sides are expected to spend heavily on
observation satellites to detect any cheating by the other. They
can also spend heavily, if they wish, on new nuke-carrying
bombers. As both nations continue to spar for technical
advantages, no immediate savings in weapons costs are expected.

     New SALT negotiations, tagged SALT II, are expected to begin
soon. They will concentrate at first on putting the offensive
weapons agreement into treaty form. Then the Russians will
undoubtedly renew their demand that U.S. tactical nukes in Europe
be limited; the U.S. will resist. The U.S. may also demand some
limitation on the megatonnage of ICBMs. The U.S.S.R. has shown a
preference for far bigger bombs than the U.S.; it is known to be
working on a 50-megaton missile (the biggest U.S. weapon is the
5- to 10-megaton Titan II). Toughest of all will be any attempts
to write detailed limits on the improvement of existing weapons,
especially since such changes are difficult to detect without on-
site inspection -- something the Kremlin has always adamantly
opposed.

     The key to future progress in arms limitation may well be
the confidence each nation has in its ability to detect
violations by the other. Both have agreed on an "open skies"
policy of non-interference with observation satellites. These are
becoming increasingly sophisticated, but whether they can detect
how many warheads hide within a missile may remain an uncertainty
beclouding the outcome of SALT II.